Finland's War of Choice

my firm opinion that such an undertaking was against the interest of the country, and from the beginning I had informed the President of the Republic and the government that under no circumstances would I lead an offensive against the great city on the Neva.”2

Soviet armed forces to quickly crumble. When this did not materialize in the first six months of the war the large Finnish military establishment became a serious economic liability that had to be rectified.

In addition, the northward advance of German Army Group North served as a magnet that drew Soviet forces away from the Finnish front.

By the time the ground war began Finland had about 500,000 men under arms, an amazing feat for a country with a population of four million.

The stocks of supplies and equipment, exhausted in March 1940, had been replenished with German assistance. The increase in automatic weapons for the infantry had significantly improved their firepower. Heavy field artillery batteries, lacking in the Winter War, were now available.

In the event that attacks are made against shipments of military supplies from the United States en route to Russia via the Arctic Ocean, and such attack is presumably made or may be claimed to be made from Finnish-controlled territory, it must be assumed that in view of the public opinion now prevailing in the United States such an incident must be assumed to lead to an immediate crisis in Finnish–American relations.2

General Demelhuber, believing that his division was under an armored attack and having no confidence in his troops, ordered a withdrawal that turned into the panic described by Ziemke:

Panicky SS troops streamed past the Corps headquarters on the road between Rovaniemi and Salla. There was total confusion at the front.

The faulty interpretation of Soviet map symbols between the Finnish border and the Litsa River at OKW was a grievous error.

Soviets confronted an enemy in the Finns who were ideally suited to fight in the kind of terrain found in their homeland. They undoubtedly also underestimated the interim improvements that had been made in the Soviet military.