The Grand Alliance

somehow, somewhere, soon.

We had to make the best of it, and that is never worth doing by halves.

The P.M. had always said that he was never to be woken up for anything but Invasion [of England]. I therefore postponed telling him till 8 a.m.

The reader must not forget that I never wielded autocratic powers, and always had to move with and focus political and professional opinion.

I had not altogether liked his attitude in the Norwegian campaign at Narvik. He had seemed to be inclined to play too much for safety and certainty, neither of which exists in war, and to be content to subordinate everything to the satisfaction of what he estimated as minimum requirements.

There is always much to be said for not attempting more than you can do and for making a certainty of what you try.

It takes the Navy three years to build a new ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition. The evacuation [i.e., rescue] will continue.”

We often hear military experts inculcate the doctrine of giving priority to the decisive theatre. There is a lot in this. But in war this principle, like all others, is governed by facts and circumstances; otherwise strategy would be too easy. It would become a drill-book and not an art; it would depend upon rules and not on an instructed and fortunate judgment of the proportions of an ever-changing scene.